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John J.Williams
Designing a Budgeting System
with Planned Confusion
One of the most perplexing realizations asso-
ciated with budgeting systems design is that no
single budgeting process can simultaneously
provide continuity and change, rigidity and
flexibility, consistency and adaptability, clarity
of purpose and multiple perspectives, stability
and innovation, or accountability and experi-
mental behavior. And yet, there is mounting
evidence from recent research findings in or-
ganization theory and design that both of these
two opposed classes of stabilizing and de-
stabilizing attributes are critical to maintaining
a proper balance in organizations facing
changing environments. In view of recent de-
velopments in the environment and emerging
thoughts in the accounting literature, there is
reason to explore the potential virtues of dual
budgeting processes coexisting within a single
budgeting information system for organiza-
tions experiencing dynamic, hostile environ-
ments.
Traditional Budgeting
as a Stabilizing Process
The traditional budgeting process has reigned
supreme in most organizations for many de-
cades. A product of historical evolution, it has
been referred to as one ofthe prime stabilizing
processes in organizations by authors Bo Hed-
burg, Sten Jonsson, Paul Nystrom, William
Starbuck, and Aaron Wildavsky.' The reasons
offered are usually a manifestation of the na-
ture of its data base, methodology, output, and
behavioral impact.
Traditional budgeting provides for continuity
in planning and control by linking the future,
present and past across all organizational pro-
cesses. It thus gives an aura of unity even
though it disproportionately affects organiza-
tional power groups and the allocation of re-
sources. At the same time, annual repetition
promotes consistency and rationalizes organi-
zational confiict. Differentiated line-item data
adds to stability and supports easy, incremental
calculation, which, in turn, is easy to change,
suppresses error, and increases its ability to
maintain a consistent course of behavior over
time.
Consistency and continuity promote accounta-
bility to higher authorities in the organization
and external agents and owners. This enhances
elements of control via efficiency and effective-
ness measures. Furthermore, accountability
introduces forces of conservation, limits spend-
ing, generates inflexibility and constrains adap-
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tiveness. Finally, as R.M. Cyert and J.G. March
maintain, unintentionally created slack arising
during the budgeting process stabilizes an or-
ganization's performance in the presence of
environmental fluctuations.^
There are emerging signals in the economy
that a stabilizing budgetary process may not be
able to adequately deal with changing organiza-
tional structures, at least within the dimension
of discretionary cost activity.
Cost Control and a Changing Environment
A significant portion of contemporary business
literature focuses on the increasing inability of
managers to cope with discretionary costs,
which are "strangling" budget planning and
resource allocation in the public sector and
"squeezing" profits in the private sector. Public
administrators appear to be very perplexed
over the growing number and magnitude of
new funding requests combined with higher
expenditures necessary to maintain incumbent
projects. Daniel Ogden notes that in many in-
stances a significant portion of annual expendi-
tures are discretionary in nature and involve
judgments about social values that are not read-
ily assessed using quantitative, rational, "scien-
tific" evaluations.-^ Apparently, the traditional
budgeting mechanism is jeopardizing outward-
looking, innovative decision making. These
cost control difficulties have not been confined
to the public sector.
In the private sector, the last several decades
have produced a technological shift in the di-
rection of increased service support systems
within the organization. The service industry
itself has experienced rapid growth and a cor-
responding escalation of discretionary costs.
Norman Macintosh reports, for example, that
roughly 80 percent of Canada's total payroll
represents discretionary costs."*
JohnJ. Williams is an associate professor of account-
ing in the Faculty of Business Administration at the
University of Alberta. His publications span several
international journals, with current research inter-
ests directed towards management accounting
systems.
In the traditional manufacturing sector of the
North American economy, and in others, to be
sure, there has been and continues to be a shift-
ing emphasis toward service-oriented support
systems at the firm level. These areas include
more sophisticated and complex maintenance
systems, computer systems, ecological and pol-
lution control systems, and a score of other
ancillary staff functions. Not only has this trend
drastically altered the structure of many
organizations, it has also magnified the impor-
tance of controlling discretionary costs. Need-
less to say, inflation has not eased the concern
of managers and public administrators over
spiralling discretionary costs in the budget.
These events have created an increasingly un-
palatable data base, which represents the core
of the traditional budgeting process. Current-
ly, many organizations are facing a relatively
larger, and more significant, portion of discre-
tionary cost activity compared with total enter-
prise activity. Theoretically, discretionary cost
activity is less objective, more qualitative, and
computationally more complex, has a low pro-
pensity to closed-system logic, and manifests
ambiguous cause and effect knowledge when
contrasted with the remaining residual class of
activity (variable or "prime" costs). Ironically,
the treatment of discretionary cost activity in
the traditional budgeting process is essentially
simple and mechanistic and incrementally
grounded on a sacred historical base. Anthony
Hopwood characterizes the budgeting of dis-
cretionary cost activity in a beautiful paradigm:
Accountant: ". . . we couldn't get a meaningful standard
against which to judge how much R&D the company
should be supporting."
Interviewer: "How did you decide on the R &D budget
then?"
Accountant: "That's a good question. At times, I myself
wondered how we did it. In general, though, it turned out
to be pretty mechanical, really. We might say, 'Let's hold it
at last year's budget' or 'at last year's plus a certain
percentage of whatever new things the R&D people want'
or it could be just a plain 10 per cent increase over last
year's. Occasionally you get some bright guy who wants to
work it out as a percentage of sales or some such thing, but
where does that get you? Does it have any greater logic
than the 10 per cent bit?"
Interviewer: "How do you arrive at these 10 per cent
figures?"
Accountant: "Oh, to be honest, it's a bit of ad-hocery
really. 10 per cent sounds right, doesn't it? And to be fair
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to ourselves, you arrive at a figure that fits in with where
you want to get to in the overall buciget. But then the R &
D people may say that this will interfere with the natural
growth of some crucial projects, so we give them 12 per
cent. It's playing around with numbers, really. And trends
as well. We look at the past record and project the 12 per
cent out into the future. Pushing it to 1975 you might fmd
a total figure of so many million pounds. Then, someone
in the accounts department will say, 'Let's try and reach
that by 1978 rather than by 1975.' So we cut the figure by
the necessary percentage."
Interviewer: "Then what?"
Accountant: "The recommendation goes to the Budget
Review Committee. In this case, I told them that the R &.- D
guys asked for, let us say, a 20 percent increase over last
year and that we, the accounts department that is, had
allowed 9 per cent. Then you get comments like. 'We have
to put a stop to this escalation of R &: D' or Let's hold it to
last year's level' But in this case, the R&D manager and
the Marketing Director are personal friends. So we heard
that 9 percent wasn't realistic: 'There has to be some
increase.' Someone else chipped in then. 'Can't we give
them 13 per cent and get a bit of rationalization in ex-
change for it?' So we had to go back and figure that one
out."'
If the traditional budgeting process cannot
facilitate the qualitative shift in emphasis that
characterizes discretionary cost activity, is there
an alternative? The following section considers
one recent development.
An Alternative Budgeting Choice
Peter Phyrr developed the concept of zero-base
budgeting in the private sector over a decade
ago to deal explicitly with an organization's dis-
cretionary cost activity.^ Since then, zero-base
budgeting has been used to support political
images in the public sector and to solve isolated
instances of budget crises in nonprofit organ-
izations.
During the intervening time period, an impres-
sive list of claims and benefits has been amassed
in the literature by zealous supporters of zero-
base budgeting. Assertions have been ad-
vanced by P. Bergeron, Henry Knight, Harper
Roehm and Joseph Castellano that it leads to
better decision making, more effective use of
resources, and yields many behavioral advan-
tages, such as improved communication, parti-
cipation, and motivation.^ These sources, along
with many others, suggest that zero-base bud-
geting is superior to its historical precedent,
traditional budgeting.
Equally obvious in the literature are those an-
tagonistic to zero-base budgeting. R.N.
Anthony claims it is fraudulent (due to its ap-
parent inability to deliver a complete review of
expenditures), unrealistic (because its method-
ology cannot work), and unmanageable (be-
cause of the large amount of paperwork).^
Mark Dirsmith and Stephen Jablonsky call
zero-base budgeting a toxin because of its in-
ability to promote decision making at institu-
tional, managerial, and technical levels in an
organization facing static and dynamic
environments.^
Two troublesome issues result from the con-
troversy over the merits and faults of tra-
ditional and zero-base budgeting. First, mana-
gers implicitly,if not explicitly, have been en-
couraged to choose between the two alterna-
tives on the premise that only one budgeting
process can exist within an organization at a
time. It is currently in vogue to use only one
budgeting process at a time. but. as Martin
Landau cautions, "managements may do this in
the interest of economy and control, but the
economy will be false and the control a ritual—
for we are acting, and organizing, as if we
'know' when we do not.""'
The second problem is really an extension of
the first one. Evidently, the literature presumes
that a choice is necessary because both zero-
base budgeting and traditional budgeting are
viewed as stabilizing processes. Such an obser-
vation supports the need for making a choice
on a cost-benefit basis. But no one has given any
serious consideration to the idea that zero-base
budgeting may be a very significant destabiliz-
ing process. If this is indeed the case (and the
thesis in the following analysis is that this is the
case), is there any validity in limiting the choice
to one process or the other?
Before turning to an analysis of the destabili-
zing characteristics of zero-base budgeting, it is
prudent to consider some recent findings in
organization theory which lend credibility to
the notion of two budgeting processes coexist-
ing within the domain of a single budgeting
information system.
Organization Theory's Salient Message
In the early 1960s, T. Burns and G.M. Stalker
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characterized entire organizations as mech-
anistic or organic.'' In the former, activities are
well defined, programmable, stable, and
geared to efficiency. The propensity for flexi-
bility, adaptability, and innovative behavior is
relatively low. However, cost and revenue activ-
ity, from a budgeting perspective, is highly pre-
dictable, controllable, and subject to simple
calculation. Organic organizations, in contrast,
manifest more uncertain tasks that are less pre-
dictable and more ambiguous. The environ-
ment is more visible and it creates changing
roles which lack precision and programming.
These activities, in terms of budgeting data, are
not predictable and thus calculation and evalu-
ation become more complex and qualitative.
Subsequent studies refined the complexity of
organizations as envisaged by Burns and
Stalker. Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch found
that diverse and changing environments re-
quire increased differentiation of the organiza-
tion and, concomitantly, demand more com-
plex and elaborate integrative devices.'^ Jay
Galbraith suggests that greater environmental
uncertainty required the organization to proc-
ess more information. '^  The findings of Robert
Duncan are extremely interesting in that the
structural processes used to make routine and
nonroutine decisions differed significantly for
the same organizational unit over time."* Simi-
larly, R. Hall found that departments with
more mechanistic tasks tended to have a higher
degree of bureaucracy than departments with
more organic tasks. '^
From a budgeting perspective, each of the
above findings suggests that most organiza-
tions experience activities that have a combina-
tion of simple and complex attributes.
Moreover, this aggregate of activities must be
dealt with on a simultaneous, ongoing basis in
terms of planning, resource allocation, and
control. Utilizing only a single, stabilizing pro-
cess, such as the traditional budgeting
mechanism, may well inhibit an organization
from maintaining equilibrium in a changing
environment precisely because its integrating
and coordinating capabilities are inherently
limited by the nature of an organization's data
base.
There are additional implications stemming
from the more recent research of Hedburgand
Jonsson.'^ These authors maintain that infor-
mation systems, like organizations, can stag-
nate because design imbalances prevent them
from processing and responding effectively to
changes in their environments. In benevolent,
stable environments, stabilizers keep behavior
and information processes consistent over time
by standardizing procedures and reinforcing
success with repeated use. Stabilizing processes
tend to build in desired rigidity and inflexibil-
ity, clarify roles and procedures, drive out am-
biguity of purpose, filter away inconsistencies
and duplication, and strive for zero
redundancy and no overlap.
Stabilizers thus breed insensitivity to change
signals through what Cyert and March de-
scribed as routinization and bureaucratic rigid-
ity, which tend to introduce serious response
delays into an organization's decision system.'^
As a consequence, organization survival is
threatened because gradual environmental
changes are not recognized, old information
processes evolve into sanctioned organization
ideologies, communication is displaced by ex-
ecutive planning, and effectiveness is measured
in terms of conformity to the past. These
stabilizing features strongly parallel and
reinforce Hopwood's discretionary spending
paradigm.
Hedburg and Jonsson suggest that when the
environment is hostile and fiuctuating, pre-
viously programmed experience and reper-
toires of behavior prevent new responses from
taking place and dampen, if not destroy, initia-
tives to behave differently. This inhibits organi-
zations' adaptability and leads to organizational
inertia. To counteract the inertia induced by
stabilizing processes, organizations require in-
formation systems that enable them to adapt
and tune into changing environments. Specifi-
cally, they need destabilizing processes which
are the antitheses of stabilizing processes.
Destabilizers act as early warning devices to
locate change signals, detect problems and con-
flicts in time, and to counteract old
standardized routines. The critical intent is to
design information systems that can dialecti-
cally destabilize organizations by using planned
confusion. Modern information system designs
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(including the traditional budgeting process),
which tend to hamper organizational search
and which filter away relevant uncertainty, di-
versity, and change signals, must be challenged
intellectually, intelligently, and with organiza-
tion of purpose in mind. Learning, unlearning,
and re learning become major design issues. De-
sign features must foster experimental behavior
and innovation, emphasize evaluations, and
offer easy arrangement and rearrangement.
The message seems patently obvious: an
organization facing a changing, diverse envi-
ronment requires a duality of processes that
simultaneously envelops both stabilizing and
destabilizing characteristics. Since budgeting
data is a reflection of the nature of an organiza-
tion's activities, the design of a budgeting
system should also encompass both stabilizing
and destabilizing processes.
Zero-Base Budgeting
as a Destabilizing Process
The task which remains is to demonstrate
analytically the destabilizing characteristics of
zero-base budgeting. Since there is no prece-
dent in the literature guiding this mission, a
formal systems approach seems most suitable
for establishing the relevant points. A systems
framework would include the conventional in-
put, through-put, output, and evaluative
(feedback) elements.
The Data Set. Zero-base budgeting deals exclu-
sively with discretionary cost activity; balance
sheet elements, such as assets, liabilities, and
equities, as well as revenue activities are outside
its domain. A subtle feature of discretionary
cost is that it is meaningful only when con-
sidered jointly from an economic and be-
havioral perspective.
Economic analysis assumes that total cost can be
decomposed into a variable component, which
is functionally related to discrete units of out-
put over a relevant range of activity, and a fixed
component, which is related to long-run capa-
city. Behavioral analysis partitions total cost
into the categories of controllable and non-
controllable according to the authority
structure of an organization. This approach
recognizes "people" rather than output as the
activity variable.
Phyrr makes it quite clear that only the fixed
cost component from the economic dimension
is relevant to zero-base budgeting because he
eliminated all those costs which are conducive
to"standard setting." It is generally accepted in
the budgeting literature to associate standard
cost with variable cost, and definitely not fixed
cost. On the behavioral side, Phyrr specifically
uses the referent "activities where the manager
has discretion to choose."'^ which is synon-
ymous with controllable cost. In short, the data
set of zero-base budgeting consists of discre-
tionary cost activities, which means that they
have the joint attributes of fixed cost and con-
trollable cost.
The data base of zero-base budgeting exem-
plifies several destabilizing attributes, one of
which is redundancy. In a brilliant article.
Landau argues that redundancy operates
through such factors as duplication and over-
lap.'^ These factors are critically important to
an "open system" because they lead to error
suppression and enhance the adaptiveness and
flexibility of organizations facing changing en-
vironments. Simply stated, duplication re-
quires a system composed of independent and
separate parts such that the failure of any one
part will not induce or directly impair the func-
tioning of other parts.
In addition, the system must have diagnostic
capabilities, adjustment mechanisms to mini-
mize the impact of errors (malfunctions), and
the ability to correct faulty parts without
damaging the whole system. These properties
of overlap are typically manifested in parallel
networks and not those wired together in a
long, linked series. Typical examples of dupli-
cation and overlap are to be found in the design
of safety features for aircraft and dual breaking
systems for automobiles.
How does zero-based budgeting contribute to
redundancy? In the first place, it duplicates
part of the domain of traditional budgeting—
both processes deal explicitly with a data base
comprising discretionary cost. More interest-
ing is the manner in which the respective data
bases are created in the budgetary process. Al-
though this aspect impinges on the methodol-
ogy or "through-put" stage, it will be consid-
ered presently.
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The logic of the traditional budgeting process
calls for the extrapolation of past levels of dis-
cretionary cost spending by account classifica-
tion, each classification to articulate with the
total master budget to produce a current level
of discretionary spending for each account
classification. In essence, the data is arranged
serially; additions or deletions to any particular
account necessarily affect all associated activi-
ties across the entire organization. For exam-
ple, a 10 percent reduction in the travel ex-
pense account at the master budget level would
affect all other differentiated travel expense
accounts, wherever their origin might be in the
subunits ofthe organization.
Zero-base budgeting, on the other hand, over-
laps the discretionary cost domain of tradition-
al budgeting and it accomplishes this through a
mutually exclusive process. Instead of a serial
linkage for each discretionary cost classification
in the budget process, zero-based budgeting
creates separate and independent units of ac-
tivity. They not only parallel one another across
the organization but in aggregate also parallel
the traditional budgeting process in dealing
with discretionary cost activity. Hence, there is
no interdependence in the process of arriving
at current budgeted discretionary costs under
the two processes. At the fundamental data
level, zero-base budgeting has potential redun-
dancy factors; their destabilizing implications
will be more completely examined in conjunc-
tion with its methodology.
Still focusing on the data base of zero-base
budgeting, it is important to remember that the
distribution of controllable cost within the or-
ganizational hierarchy is directly related to the
dispersion of authority by the top echelon. This
leaves considerable latitude for creative and
experimental behavior, since the choice of dis-
cretionary activities can span various subseg-
ments of the total planned activities of the or-
ganization depending on the needs of manage-
ment. It follows that the choice of data base in
this context becomes easy to arrange and con-
tributes to increased fiexibility. An organiza-
tion can thus adapt to a changing organization-
al-environmental interface without severe
pressures of rigidity and constraint.
The potential use of zero-base budgeting at
discontinuous time intervals has also been con-
doned in the literature. This means that the
timing of zero-base and traditional budgeting
would not necessarily be synchronized. Zero-
base budgeting's data cycle would also be incon-
sistent if time periods were skipped. This
would challenge the key criterion of predicta-
bility in planning; emphasis would shift to an
uncertain future rather than merely extrapo-
lating on a known past. No doubt this would
also strain the conventional mode of planning
in the budgeting process, but fiexibility would
be increased—most likely at the expense of
enhanced ambiguity of roles and organization-
al purpose. Indeed, such destabilizing charac-
teristics are the very cornerstone of designing a
budgeting information system with planned
confusion.
ZBB Methodology. As a budgeting process, zero-
base budgeting is a planning and control mech-
anism and includes the elements of objective
setting, operational decision making, and eval-
uation. Its method is described by Phyrr as a
bottom-to-top communication process involv-
ing two basic steps.-" The first step is one of
differentiation. Discrete activities (of a discre-
tionary cost nature) for decision units are ana-
lyzed and developed in the form of decision
packages within the context of a minimum level
of effort (usually below the current level of
expenditure). Any additional activity for a deci-
sion unit can be formulated in an independent
series of incremental decision packages, each
one having a specified dollar cost. In addition
to the requested dollar funding, all of the nar-
rative explaining why the expenditure is neces-
sary, consequences of not performing an activ-
ity, alternative procedures for accomplishing
the goals, cross-impact analysis with other deci-
sion units, and cost-benefit analysis are includ-
ed in the decision package documentation.
There is no theoretical limit to the number of
decision units identified or the number of deci-
sion packages developed within each decision
unit.
The second step is one of integration. All deci-
sion packages are ranked, first within each de-
cision unit, then vertically across all decision
units in the organizational hierarchy. The
ranking procedure can be accomplished
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through cost-benefit analysis or subjective eval-
uation, but, empirically, the former approach
has been the most generally accepted.
Redundancy factors also characterize the
methodology of zero-base budgeting described
above because there is duplication of purpose
and planning relative to the traditional budget-
ing process. Internal to its own boundaries,
zero-base budgeting stresses multiple objec-
tives, diversity of perspectives, and incompati-
bility of measurement. Besides the mere alloca-
tion of resources and operational decision
processes, Phyrr stresses the objective setting
and evaluation capabilities of zero-base budget-
ing vis a vis organizational states and dynamic
environments.2' In attempting to fulfill these
idealistic purposes, zero-base budgeting must
penetrate several different decision levels in an
organization.
Dirsmith and Jablonsky challenge the potential
ability of zero-base budgeting to commingle the
decision strategies required at the technical,
managerial, and institutional levels.-^ ^ In doing
so, they refer to the contention of T. Parsons,
that quantitive and qualitative shifts in the deci-
sion process are required as one progresses
through these three levels.-^ This creates ambi-
guity and distorts the clarity of roles under the
zero-base-budgeting process, and means that it
cannot be uniformly applied, interpreted, and
used across diverse sectors of an organization.
Planning discretionary expenditures becomes
ambiguous because of the economic dimension
associated with the data base. Fixed costs are
troublesome because management does not
know what the proper level of fixed costs
should be for any budget period. Paradoxical-
ly, the decision on the appropriate level of fixed
costs is shifted to lower levels in the organiza-
tion under zero-base budgeting's framework.
The traditional role of top management's ob-
jective-setting process is now reversed, but sub-
jective judgment is still required at these lower
levels. Leonard Merewitz and Stephen Sosnick
nicely summarize the remaining dilemma: re-
gardless of the authority level involved, appro-
priations cannot be justified, per se; there is no
basis for determining whether the allocation of
funds could be improved and no way of ascer-
taining the efficiency associated with any given
allocation and expenditure.'"'
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Yet there is the expectation in zero-base bud-
geting that lower-level management is capable
of and motivated toward the identification of
legitimate output goals within their respective
decision units, searching out alternative
courses of action, quantifying them, and rank-
ing them accordingly. No doubt this would
stimulate some degree of experimental behav-
ior, coexistent with a transition of the normal
planning roles for lower-level management.
The method of calculation in the zero-base-
budgeting methodology raises other ambigui-
ties and displays still other destabilizing fea-
tures. Unlike the incremental calculation of
line-item dollar magnitudes inherent in tradi-
tional budgeting systems, the method of calcu-
lation in zero-base budgeting has been called
comprehensive.-^ This feature relates to sev-
eral destabilizing attributes, because the calcu-
lation method envelops the process of evalua-
tion in the planning stage and affects error
recognition and correction.
Evaluation is certainly complex—each inde-
pendent decison package is presumed to focus
on outputs of the system as they relate to strate-
gic objectives. Operationally, however, cost-
benefit analysis can only quantify the costs (in-
puts). There is ample room fore)ctremesof bias
in the evaluation process, which further contri-
bute to ambiguity.
The evaluation process (in a prior sense) is ahis-
torical: there is no retention by definition be-
cause all discretionary expenditures for the
current budget period are reviewed "from
scratch." From one time period to thexiext, the
consistency and continuity of decision packages
are nonexistent. The result is induced amnesia.
The presence of such a state in the budgetary
process prompted Wildavsky to conclude that
"both calculation and conflict increase expo-
nentially, the former worsening selection, and
the latter, correction of error."-^
In a different, but not contradictory, sense, the
overlapping qualities of zero-base budgeting
can inhibit errors and lead to a more reliable
information system. Not only are decision units
viewed as separate entities, but each decision
package developed within any decision unit is
assumed to be serially independent and al-
lowed to stand on its own merit. Therefore in
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addition to potential diagnostic capabilities
manifested in the cost-benefit evaluation, the
impact of errors or malfunctions (in an ex post
sense) can be handled in isolation. Marginal
adjustments to the organization are possible
because of the parallel network of mutually
exclusive decision packages.
The calculation of cost-benefit decision pack-
ages illuminates other destabilizing properties.
As Wildavsky observes, "For purposes of re-
source allocation, which is what budgeting is
about, ranking objectives without considera-
tion of resources is irrational."-'' Yet this is the
core of zero-base budgeting's procedural
mechanism: decision packages are prepared
without explicit knowledge of the amount of
funding or even whether any of the decision
packages within a decision unit will be funded.
When such "systems" logic is combined with
nonquantifiable outputs, it is clear that zero-
base budgeting does not avoid filtering away
inconsistencies and incompatible information.
Susan Streufert found that this type of decision
environment increases the complexity of the
data base, enhances anxiety and frustration,
but renders potential problems more visible.-^ ^
The ranking process, distinct from calculation,
harbors additional destabilizing design fea-
tures which arise from two fundamental issues.
First, the specific level in the hierarchy at which
to consolidate decision packages must be de-
cided. One possibility is to have only a single
ranking at the top of the organization, but this
would certainly create some severe logistics
problems and effectively negate the role of
middle management in the budgeting process.
Instead, consolidated rankings are generally
advocated for each progressively higher au-
thority level in the organization structure.
Phyrr suggests that the optimal arrangement
would ultimately depend on factors such as the
number of decision packages involved, time
and effort associated with reviewing these deci-
sion packages, the ability and willingness of
lower-level managers to rank unfamiliar activi-
ties, and the need for an extensive organiza-
tional review.^^ In a dynamic environment, it is
most unlikely that standardized procedures or
elements of consistency would ensue.
Phyrr also advocates either a consolidated,
multilevel ranking process conforming to the
"formal" authority hierarchy or one based on
groupings of similar activities that transcend
normal authority boundaries. Either situation
yields flexibility and emphasizes evaluation;
however, the latter clearly would induce in-
creased role ambiguity and conflict, not to
mention the increased complexity of ex post
facto performance evaluation. On the other
hand, the multilevel approach to ranking
would encompass more review, increase the
search process, and enhance the sensitivity of
the organization to change signals reflected in
proposed discretionary expenditures.
The second fundamental issue associated with
ranking concerns the basis for determining the
ranking of decision packages at any particular
level in the organization. The absence of one
definitive method contributes to ambiguity in
zero-base budgeting in additional ways. Phyrr
originally suggested a committee type of voting
mechanism. For example, decision unit mana-
gers from the same level of authority would
form a group chaired by the next higher rank-
ing manager. This scheme would continue to
the top of the organization until all decision
packages were ranked. More recently, weight-
ed voting schemes, the development of a value
matrix, and methods relying on bargaining and
negotiation have been advanced as alternative
bases by Henry Knight.^"
All of these techniques manifest a high degree
of arbitrariness and political sensitivity because
the output goals represented by each funding
request are ambiguous and ill defined. A simi-
lar anomaly occurs with ex post facto evalua-
tion. The rationale underlying these assess-
ment problems will be examined more fully in
the following section. In the final analysis, it
appears to be elements of power, authority,
and bargaining prowess by lower-level mana-
gers that would dominate any chosen technique.
The Output. The output for zero-base budget-
ing is a vector of ranked decision packages
identified in order of decreasing benefit to the
organization. At this point, only one decision
remains for top management: resources are
simply allocated to decision units by funding all
decision packages up to the cut-off point, which
exhausts the resources available for the current
budgeting period.
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It is perhaps expedient at this point to caution
that zero-base budgeting is a product of logic,
not historical evolution. Its purposes and pro-
cedures represent a set of postulated proposi-
tions. However, the design of its output format
is surely as artistic (versus scientific) as that
found in any other discipline. To be sure, the
literature is replete with how-to-do-it formats
for decision package design. They can be sim-
ple or complex, detailed or vague or easily rear-
ranged, and can stimulate as much creativity as
management is willing to put forth. Currently
available tutorial and seminar material substan-
tiates the immense fiexibility and possibilities
for experimental behavior induced by zero-
base-budgeting format design.
In principle, the output of zero-base budgeting
has a built-in contingency mechanism. To the
extent that changes occur in the level of avail-
able funding during the budget cycle, the final
ranking may be easily reviewed and rearranged
so that discarded decision packages are reacti-
vated. Of course, changes in the environment
may not affect the level of funding which is
available per se, but may create a need to order
decision packages in a different way at some
interim point during the budget cycle. The out-
put vector of ranked decision packages in this
case allows for easy review and permits "local-
ized" changes if necessary, without jeopardiz-
ing the assumed benefits of all the remaining,
previously activated decision packages.
Control and Evaluation. The formalized features
of zero-base budgeting abruptly end with the
systems features outlined above. Budgeted dis-
cretionary cost data would normally be fed into
the chart of accounts contained in an organiza-
tion's accounting system and ex post facto mon-
itoring would ensue.
However, one of the reasons for carefully de-
lineating the joint attributes of discretionary
cost (the fixed and controllable) is to facilitate
the identification of the type of assessment
which is appropriate for measuring the system-
ic relevance of zero-base budgeting. James
Thompson provides a convenient two-dimen-
sional matrix for analyzing this problem.^'
Along one dimension, beliefs about causes and
effects can be classified at the extremes of
"complete" and "incomplete," while goal rele-
vance can be partitioned into the categories
"crystallized" and "ambiguous" along the other
dimension.
For the joint state "complete/crystallized," mea-
sures of efficiency are appropriate, because in-
put-output relationships can be accurately de-
fined and put into operation on a relative basis.
However, the joint state "incomplete/crystal-
lized" calls for the instrumental test of deter-
mining whether the desired goal is achieved,
and is typically referred to in accounting as a
measure o^ effectiveness. Efficiency tests are not
appropriate here because there is no way of
assessing the causal action. Finally, if goals are
ambiguous, then, regardless of the state of
knowledge about causes and effects (the com-
plete or incomplete), assessment must be done
by social reference groups.
There seems to be a very close association be-
tween the evaluative concepts germane to zero-
base budgeting and the framework established
by Thompson. There are no scientific stan-
dards available for discretionary costs because
the optimal relationship between results (out-
put) and resource requirements (input) is not
known. Results from specific discretionary ac-
tivities such as research and development near-
ly defy identification, never mind quantifica-
tion. Thus, efficiency and effectiveness tests are
inappropriate for zero-base budgeting. This
leaves social reference tests as constituting an
integral part of the evaluation and assessment
of zero-base budgeting. Peer group rankings,
value matrices, and bargaining all reflect just
this kind of test.
For purposes of ex post facto monitoring, es-
tablished amounts of discretionary cost spend-
ing for each decision package or unit can be
viewed as crystallized in the absence of no
changes. However, knowledge of causes and
effects in discretionary cost spending still re-
mains less than scientific. Under such circum-
stances, accountants traditionally resort to ef-
fectiveness measures over the budget cycle.
Such assessments are equally appropriate for
zero-base budgeting.
In summary, each system element of zero-base
budgeting reveals a subset of destabilizing
properties. Admittedly, there is not complete
uniformity of these properties across each ele-
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ment in the system. In aggregate, though, zero-
base budgeting has the potential to permeate
the organization and change signals reaching
not only the organization but also different
management levels. It can foster the type of
experimental behavior and variety in commun-
ication envisaged and endorsed by Burns and
Stalker, Hedburg and Jonsson, Landau, and
Wildavsky.^- Focusing on individual decision
makers, zero-base budgeting envelops a variety
of perceptions and evaluation techniques, such
as the mixed and integrated cognitive styles
noted by Richard Mason and Ian Mitroff, the
learning styles studied by David Kolb, and mul-
tiple performance criteria acknowledged by
V.F. Ridgeway.^^ Finally, zero-base budgeting
has the potential to counteract the stabilizing
process by which changes in budgeted discre-
tionary expenditures (signals) are normally
brought about. The search process of establish-
ing decision packages, adding, deleting, or re-
arranging rankings as the process transcends
the hierarchy en route to the ultimate ranking
at the top, is fundamentally different from the
incremental stabilizing approach of the tradi-
tional budgeting process.
In short, zero-base budgeting manifests a rich
set of destabilizing attributes which are rooted
in its entire methodology. Inherent in its pro-
cess are ambiguity, inconsistency, redundancy,
multiple perspectives, flexibility, and imperm-
anence. The basic philosophy of zero-base bud-
geting promotes innovative and experimental
behavior, encourages evaluation of strategic,
managerial, and operational decision making,
and stresses proaction in a changing envi-
ronment.
The Final Message
There is ample evidence from recent organiza-
tion research that no one characteristic can suit-
ably describe the complexity of organization
structures in changing environments. Similar-
ly, there is no theoretical or practical reason to
treat the corresponding heterogeneous kinds
of activity that characterize these organizations
as homogeneous relative to their budgeting in-
formation content. In addition, there is every
indication that the environment is changing,
changing in such a manner that it has a turbu-
lent, not a smoothing, effect on the nature of
discretionary cost, which is a perpetual phe-
nomenon of organizational activity.
It seems imperative that accounting research-
ers dispel their disparaging remarks about
whether zero-base budgeting is or is not better
than traditional budgeting. Managers, too,
must abandon the idea that a single stabilizing
budgetary process will promote organizational
equilibrium in a changing, diverse environ-
ment. They must reshape their thinking to in-
clude the planned coexistence of both destabil-
izing processes (zero-base budgeting) and sta-
bilizing processes (traditional budgeting) with-
in a single budgeting information system.
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